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Which freedom to defend? Freedom of research 
between elitism and participation 
 
 
Today we witness a variety of attacks on the different forms of research. Opposing these 
attacks against scientists, journalists and artists, the demand for a freedom of research is an 
important common ground for organizing solidarity and publicly denouncing repression, 
intimidation and manipulation. However, the notion of freedom of research is a complex 
one and it is worthwhile to pause for a short moment, in order to reflect on its possible 
implications and limitations and to ask: which freedom to defend? 
Nobody would probably explicitly support the idea that freedom of research means the 
absence of any constraint. Such a notion of the freedom of research would be meaningless. 
Instead, usually relevant constraints are picked, it seems, according to “moral” or “political” 
intuition. This intuition may differ significantly between persons and contexts and may 
more often than not even be contradictory. However, in the negative and ad hoc usage, 
which marks the notion of freedom of research, such implicit conflicts stay largely invisible. 
Due to this, almost anyone can agree to the abstract demand of a freedom of research today. 
But, in this situation “freedom of research” can all too easily become an empty rally cry. 
For this paper I try to advance the development of a more meaningful notion of the free-
dom of research in two ways. First, I want to present an association, which, in the context 
of German academia, is linked with the “freedom of science” like no other: The “league 
freedom of science” (Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft1). The case of the BFW is relevant 
 
1 In the following I will mainly refer to it as BFW. 
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even for a more general discussion, because it creates a friction surface for the contempo-
rary debate, as it was distinctively conservative in large parts and as its demand for “freedom” 
is at odds with more progressive interpretations of the freedom of research that, for in-
stance, I would intuitively lean towards. The BFW is kind of a kaleidoscope, which can help 
us discern the different facets of the notion at hand. In order to clarify this question of how 
freedom of research can be (and, in fact, is) justified, I will draw on the work of the philos-
opher Torsten Wilholt, who distinguishes three principal justifications for the freedom of 
research. On this basis I will argue for a political understanding of the freedom of research, 
which allows to make a strong statement for independent research based on the publicity 
of knowledge while, at the same time, fostering democratic participation in science. 
 
I. Which freedom of research? – The “Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft”2 
 
Looking back to the discussion of the freedom of research in Germany, probably the most 
obvious institution that comes into mind is the “Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft” – a group 
mainly formed by professors who basically opposed the student’s movement of the 1960s 
and the attempted democratic reforms in German universities of that time. How is it that 
the notion of “freedom of science” became so important for liberal and neo-conservative 
professors after 1968? 
The “league” was founded 1970 in Bonn and dissolved 2015, having already lost most of its 
influence in the late 1970s. The protagonists of the BFW came together from different local 
associations, groups, and loose networks of professors, which were united in their opposi-
tion to the student’s movement, to the presence of socialist groups within the university 
and to efforts to democratize the university by implicating different status groups equally 
into university committees.3 
Even though most of the positions and demands predated the “league” and were tied to 
more or less local topics, the political strategy of the “protest of the professors” (Wehrs) 
changed markedly when it was institutionally established under the umbrella of the BFW. 
 
2 My description of the BFW is mainly taken from two recent historiographic studies by Nikolai Wehrs 
and Svea Koischwitz. I thus do not present own historical research, rather I am looking for some more 
general implications of their findings (cf. Nikolai Wehrs, Protest der Professoren. Der « Bund Freiheit 
der Wissenschaft » in den 1970er Jahren, Göttingen, Wallstein, 2014 ; Svea Koischwitz, Der Bund Frei-
heit der Wissenschaft in den Jahren 1970–1976. Ein Interessenverband zwischen Studentenbewe-
gung und Hochschulreform, Köln/Weimar/Wien, Böhlau, 2017). 
3 In a Humboldtian tradition German academia is largely self-administered. However solely full profes-
sors (Ordinarien) were traditionally considered to be qualified to take decisions. In the late 1960s 
voices became louder, which demanded the equal representation and co-determination of profes-
sors, Assistenten (permanent postdoc researchers) and students. These demands were heavily con-
tested especially when it came to appointment committees (cf. Olaf Bartz, Expansion und Umbau. 
Hochschulreformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen 1964 und 1977, die hochschule, 
n° 2, 2007, p. 154–170, here 164 f.) 
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While former initiatives had mainly tried to win informal influence over politicians and 
publicists, the BFW addressed the general public, with an aggressive PR strategy, seeking 
to turn into scandal the state of things in the contemporary university, which they described 
as the “weakest institution of this society”4, especially susceptible to radical subversion. In 
fact, a large part of the BFW’s work consisted of publicizing infractions against professors 
and the disruption of seminars or lectures by students, and turn them into scandals. 
 
One iconic example for this strategy of public scandal-creation is Folkmar Koenigs, a law 
professor at the Technische Universität Berlin, who had been doused with yellow paint by 
a communist group after trying to remove a notice by students, denouncing members of a 
predecessor organisation of the BFW as shamous (see figue 1).5  
 
Figure 1: Folkmar Koenigs, turning student’s attacks into a publicity event. His poster 
reads: “TU professor, disfavoured by the communists” (picture alliance / Konrad Giehr). 
(For figure 1 see: https:/tagesspiegel.de/images/koenigs_prof/10082242/3) 
 
Such attacks were described by the “league” as “defamation, terror, acts of violence and 
infractions against the law”6 and were certainly infractions against the freedom of research. 
At the same time the BFW members did for their part not hesitate to publicly denounce 
colleagues, whom they reckoned to be not sufficiently anti-communist and even to create 
and publish lists of suspicious colleagues, who should be isolated and banned from posts.7 
In the discourse of the time, the BFW was predominantly seen as a conservative and elitist 
association of full professors (Ordinarien), who wanted to defend their inherited privileges. 
Nikolai Wehrs and Svea Koischwitz show, however, that this explanation is too simple. 
They argue that the BFW was strongly supported by a younger generation of professors, 
who themselves were critical of the “traditional” university. Actually, many of the BFW’s 
members were considered to be “reformers” in the early 1960s. The reforms back then were 
driven by other motives than the “democratization” sought in the 1970s, though. By the 
end of the 1950s, policy makers increasingly feared that the traditional elitist German edu-
cation system could not produce a sufficient number of qualified employees, officials and 
researchers, assuring the nation’s political and economic importance in the world. The term 
of a “catastrophe of education” (Bildungskatastrophe), coined by Georg Picht in the mid -
 
4 See the founding proclamation of the BFW: Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, « Gründungsaufruf », 
Darmstädter Studentenzeitung, vol. 18, no 116, 1970, p. 25. 
5 Cf. Wehrs, op. cit., p. 327–329. 
6 Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, op. cit. 
7 Cf. Koischwitz, op. cit., p. 395–409 ; Wehrs, op. cit., p. 269–276. 
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1960s,8 envisioned the dystopia of a collapsing education system, dropping behind the two 
superpowers of the time.9 In this context a “technocratic” discourse on reforms of the ed-
ucation system gained momentum. It aimed at facilitating access to higher education, ex-
tending and de-hierarchizing the staff, and modernizing the organization of science and 
education. 
By the end of the 1960s the denotation of “reforms” had however markedly changed. 
Against the background of the student’s movement the political dimension of the univer-
sity as a societal institution became more and more relevant. While the technocratic dis-
course aimed at efficiently and functionally steering mass education, the administration of 
the university now was subjected to demands to enable an equal participation of different 
status groups. A “democratization” of procedures was called for. 
This was exactly the line of rupture for the members of the BFW, as can easily be read from 
their founding document from 1970:  
 
“Where ideologies prevail which deem the destruction of the given a precondition 
for the realization of utopian goals, the cry for reforms does no longer serve a mod-
ernization and increased efficiency of the institution, but aims at its paralysis and 
destruction.”10 
 
While in democratic terms, a broad participation of the persons concerned seems a value in 
itself, for the BDW the institution’s “efficiency”11 is the final argument. Reforms are to 
technically improve the institutions procedures. But democratizing reforms were not only 
rejected in the light of technocratic arguments. One of the underlying motives was the 
more general rejection of external influences on research and education: 
 
“The fundament of the freedom of science is, however, that only scientists decide 
who is accepted as a scientist.”12 
 
 
8 See Georg Picht, Die deutsche Bildungskatastrophe. Analyse und Dokumentation, 2. ed., München, 
dtv, 1965. 
9 Cf. Wehrs, op. cit., p. 40–51. 
10 Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, op. cit., own translation. 
11 This efficiency cannot, however, solely be reduced to an economic concept. It is deeply rooted in a 
technocratic attitude, which is closely linked with a functionalist and modernist worldview, cf. David 
Gartman, « Why Modern Architecture Emerged in Europe, not America: The New Class and the Aes-
thetics of Technocracy », Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 17, no 5, 2000, p. 75–96. 
12 Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, op. cit., own translation. 
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At the same time, and probably even more importantly, participation of students in the 
academic administration was rejected, because it appeared to be a means of takeover by 
dogmatic Marxists, and thus a first step towards overthrowing the state. 
 
“The unlimited participation of students is the crowbar by which the German uni-
versity as the weakest institution of society can be unhinged.”13 
 
The BFW fought relentless fights against Marxist colleagues. In their perspective, this was 
seen as the protection of freedom and plurality of research against a dogmatist-Marxist 
dictatorship. From the perspective of the student organizations, the league was, however, 
suppressing free research by discriminating minority Marxist positions.14 For the BFW, the 
academic conflicts were first and foremost seen as elements in a global communist threat. 
They perceived themselves as defenders of the state (and thus of democracy). From their 
technocratic perspective, the stability of the state depended on the “functional construction 
of its institutions”.15 The university is supposed to be managed based on “factual authority”. 
In a paradoxical chain of argumentation, “democratized” and thus “politicized” committees 
do subvert its efficiency and, thus, “democracy”.16 
The BDW did not explicitly define its understanding of “freedom” or even of “research” or 
“science”. What conception did then guide its activities? The kind of freedom its members 
were interested in is implicitly deducible from the conflicts they chose. 
There are two different and sometimes contradicting motives behind the BFWs defence of 
the “freedom of research”. The BFW strongly argues in its favour when it comes to the 
supposed predominance of dogmatic Marxism and attacks on its members. Its positioning, 
however, becomes highly ambivalent if one considers its own activities. Its members were 
not shying away from intimidating other academics and researchers. The overall rejection 
of external influences seems to point to an individual freedom, which is sought to be main-
tained as a personal privilege, guaranteeing freedom from a political questioning of research 
goals, motivations etc. This points to the persistence of an aristocratic attitude which has 
strongly shaped German academia and whose remnants can be traced until today.17 At the 
 
13 Id., own translation. 
14 Cf. Koischwitz, op. cit., p. 293. 
15 Ibid., p. 299, own translation. 
16 Cf. id. Of course, the meaning of “democracy” was itself at play in the disputes of the time. A more 
encompassing discussion of this broader conflict would, however, exceed the scope of this article. 
17 To name but one influential figure: Max Weber insisted in his lecture “Science as a Vocation” from 
1917 that science is a matter of intellectual aristocracy rather than democracy (Max Weber, Wissen-
schaft als Beruf, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1995, p. 10; cf. also Fritz K. Ringer, The decline of the German 
mandarins. The German academic community 1890–1933, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
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same time the BFWs members can be distinguished by a technocratic attitude, which does 
not promote “freedom of research” as a goal in itself, but rather as a means for enhancing 
the system’s performance. One of the BFW’s proponents, Wilhelm Hennis, insisted: 
 
„Today, the freedom of science is hardly justified metaphysically anymore, but usu-
ally exclusively under the aspect of its utility, according to which only a free science 
is a progressing science, capable of development.”18 
 
Against this double and ambivalent background, the BFW was able to ward off any external 




II. Three arguments for a freedom of research 
 
I now want to link the descriptions of the BFW with a more general discussion of the free-
dom of research. Torsten Wilholt20 distinguishes three major arguments for its justification. 
His work can help us to better understand if, and to what extent, the freedom of research 
is opposed to a political and participatory conception of research and its organizations. The 
BFW explicitly argued against democracy and politics in science (in order to maintain dem-
ocratic state institutions). How is such an opposition of a free research and politics justified? 
And are there alternative ways of stressing the importance of a free research, which do not 
preclude democratic procedures and political positionings? 
The three principle types of arguments in favour of the freedom of research according to 
Wilholt are: 
1) The justification of a freedom of research based on reasons of autonomy. 
2) Freedom of research based on epistemological justifications. 
3) A political justification of the freedom of research. 
1) The justification by autonomy is based on enlightenment subject philosophies. Especially 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) considers the “Denkfreiheit”, the freedom of thought, 
to be an inalienable human right and therefore as something which marks the subject as a 
human being. Taken up by Wilhelm von Humboldt, this argument had great influence on 
 
1969). For the persistence of “feudal” structures in academia see Tilman Reitz, « Academic hierar-
chies in neo-feudal capitalism: how status competition processes trust and facilitates the appropria-
tion of knowledge », Higher Education, vol. 73, no 6, 2017, p. 871–886. 
18 As cited in Koischwitz, op. cit., p. 296, own translation. 
19 Cf. Wehrs, op. cit., p. 357 f. ; Koischwitz, op. cit., p. 295–297. 
20 T. WILHOLT, Die Freiheit der Forschung. Begründungen und Begrenzungen, Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2012. 
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the development especially of German academia.21 However, it has clear limitations. Most 
importantly, it only provides a justification for the freedom of the individual researcher. It 
grants her the right to choose a subject of inquiry according to her own preferences. How-
ever, it falls short of serving as an adequate justification for research as a collective practice. 
No necessity to provide the practical means which are indispensable for individually pur-
suing a specific question arises from this argument, nor does it call for an obligation to 
systematically foster the freedom of research on a disciplinary or collective level.22 
2) For the epistemological argument, freedom of research is necessary, because it is a way of 
increasing knowledge. The free pursuit of one’s own interests and own ideas yields the 
common good of truth, just as the invisible hand of the market transforms individual in-
terests into a common wealth according to economic liberalism.23 The fundamental as-
sumption is (1) that freedom of research produces a diversity of positions and (2) that this 
diversity is a precondition for the progression of knowledge.24 Such a perspective, however, 
largely frames science as a neutral institution. Oftentimes, a natural asymmetry between 
truth and falseness is presumed: false statements can be accepted within the plurality of 
positions, because truth is procedurally guaranteed; it will prevail ‘in the long run’.25 How-
ever, if one considers the social and political dimensions which unavoidably surround and 
permeate scientific disputes26, such an automatic tendency towards the truth becomes less 
evident. 
Within the epistemological argument, there are two typical reasons for accepting the aim 
of advancing knowledge: an intrinsic one, arguing that knowledge is an aim in itself, vs. an 
instrumentalist one, arguing that knowledge is important for external reasons such as eco-
nomic competitivity.27 
3) While the first two arguments are still highly popular in current debates and will proba-
bly have a familiar ring to them, Torsten Wilholt proposes a third argument for the freedom 
of research – the political justification. Here, the value of the freedom of research is drawn 
from its contribution to a democratic society. This contribution can be found on two levels. 
On the one hand, open democratic processes of decision making are in need of commonly 
available knowledge – rather than just instrumental or secretive knowledge, available only 
 
21 Ibid., p. 47-49 
22 Ibid., p. 56-62 
23 Interestingly Adam Smith introduces the famous concept of the “invisible hand” not in his economi-
cal writings, but in his moral philosophy. Cf. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, K. Haa-
konssen (éd.), Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 215 ; see also Wilholt, op. cit., 
p. 100–110. 
24 Wilholt, op. cit., p. 110–116. 
25 Ibid., p. 87–88. 
26 As has been pointed out by classical studies in the sociology of science, cf. Robert K. Merton, « Sci-
ence and the Social Order », Philosophy of Science, vol. 5, no 3, 1938, p. 321–337. 
27 Wilholt, op. cit., p. 117–158. 
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to political elites.28 However, while this is a valid point, the freedom of research is not only 
relevant as a provider of seemingly “neutral” facts for the political discussion. What is more, 
freedom of research is relevant for the emergence of political subjects. Torsten Wilholt ad-
vances this argument drawing on Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative understanding of democ-
racy as a communicative discourse.29 Such a discourse cannot be reduced to the conflict and 
aggregation of pre-established interests and meanings, as classical liberal and pluralist po-
litical theories propose.30 One does, however, not have to adhere to the Habermasian ideal 
of a non-hierarchical discourse in order to support such a conception of the becoming of 
the democratic subject. Agonistic and radical concepts of democracy, which have been very 
influential in recent years, should have few problems to support this non-individualistic 
perspective on the political subject.31 The important point is: Science is engaged in social 
practices, which do not presuppose a fixed political subject with definitely shaped interests, 
attitudes and opinions. Instead, political subjects are shaped and reshaped within the polit-
ical process. In this line of argumentation science becomes democratically relevant by in-
volving the political public in science’s procedures. This active participation in research 
practices transforms the political subject. The independence of research is democratically 
justified, because of its contribution to the political ‘subjectivation’ and ‘objectivation’, the 
co-emergence of relevant knowledge and “persons concerned”, not for being a ‘de-politi-
cized’ sphere. This implies that freedom of research is not only a freedom of the hermit, 
the self-sufficient thinker.32 Thus, for the political justification academic freedom becomes 
the more pressing, the stronger science openly engages with the public debate, without 
falling back on the authoritative gesture of preaching an irrevocable truth. In short, this 
perspective allows to avoid the false opposition of science as either a pure and detached 
enterprise or as the rational means – a mere instrument – for politics. Science as an inde-




The case of the “Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft” points to the fact that the demand for 
“freedom of research” can promote very different and in part contradictory positions. This 
 
28 Ibid., p. 224–225. 
29 Ibid., p. 234–236. 
30 Cf. Isaac D. Balbus, « The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis », Politics & Society, 
vol. 1, no 2, 1971, p. 154–166. 
31 Cf. Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, London/New York, Verso, 2000, p. 98–105 ; Jacques 
Rancière, La Mésentente. Politique et philosophie, Paris, Galilée, 1995. 
32 This is especially important, because individual conceptions of research and authorship are increas-
ingly complemented or even replaced by large scale projects and experimental settings, which un-
dermine individualistic conceptions of science (cf. Karin Knorr Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the 
Sciences Make Knowledge, Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 166–171). 
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makes us aware of the implicit assumptions which are at stake today when freedom of re-
search is evoked for both defending academics against state repression and, for instance, 
rejecting limitations imposed on research in genetic engineering. 
Using the typology by Wilholt, we can see that the BFW’s argumentation mainly drew on 
justifications by autonomy and on epistemological justifications. Warding off “political” 
influences on research, the BFW’s members insisted on a very specific autonomy of aca-
demia: On the one hand, they took up an aristocratic understanding of science, which is 
prominent in the German intellectual field. On the other hand, the technocratic inclination 
of the BFW’s members advanced a very different rationale. Here, freedom of research was 
not a personal entitlement, granted to the elitist intellectual class of the “German Man-
darines”33. Rather, the freedom of research was justified by its alleged contribution to the 
smooth running of the state machine. This perspective can be understood as a specific form 
of the epistemological argument: namely, an instrumentalist one. Academic freedom, here, 
is thought to be beneficial for the advancement of knowledge. This knowledge, however, is 
not an aim in itself but it is expected to advance political and economic planning.34 Such 
justifications based on individual autonomy and epistemological advantages can, as the case 
of the BFW shows, support a conservative position in the academic field, integrating ‘aris-
tocratic’ and ‘technocratic’ worldviews.  
Today, such technocratic aspirations, aiming at an economic rationalization and increased 
efficiency will likely not cater to a euphemism of state planning, but they can foster efforts 
to remould the university according to a neoliberal governmentality.  
To be clear, this article does not intend to reduce the complex notion of freedom of research 
to a politically convenient interpretation. It does not seek to exclude anybody from using 
the term, be it based on individualistic, liberal or democratic reasons. However, if we con-
sider the differentiations mentioned above, we can avoid contradictions arising from inad-
vertent shifts between different justifications. Also, it can help to sensitize us for the pos-
sible implications of specific notions of freedom of research. If we want to defend the free-
dom of research without falling back on conservative and a(nti)-political concepts of re-
search, the political justification of the freedom of research is of particular interest, opening 
up new venues of the debate. This freedom of research can criticize the subjection of re-
search under economic criteria, without falling back on a state centred position. It can ques-
tion the secretive research on military technology, without subjecting science to fancies of 
 
33 Cf. Fritz K. Ringer, The decline of the German mandarins. The German academic community 1890–
1933, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1969 
34 With this, the BFW’s positions resonate well with the optimistic view of planning in the early 1970th, 
when, animated by cybernetic theory, even a general “government computer” seemed graspa-
ble. Cf. Dirk van Laak, « Planung, Planbarkeit und Planungseuphorie », Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 
2010, http://docupedia.de/zg/van_laak_planung_v1_de_2010 (11.1.2019). 
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“public opinion”.35 It can, finally, help us to oppose manifest and latent manipulations of 
research aims and processes while inviting a public participation in research and fostering 
the engagement of science in public debates. 
 
LITERATURE 
BALBUS, Isaac D., « The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis », Politics & Soci-
ety, vol. 1, no 2, 1971, p. 151-177. 
BARTZ, Olaf, Expansion und Umbau. Hochschulreformen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
zwischen 1964 und 1977, die hochschule, n° 2, 2007, p. 154–170, here 164 f. 
BUND FREIHEIT DER WISSENSCHAFT, « Gründungsaufruf », Darmstädter Studentenzeitung, 
vol. 18, no 116, 1970, p. 25. 
GARTMAN, David, « Why Modern Architecture Emerged in Europe, not America: The New 
Class and the Aesthetics of Technocracy », Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 17, no 5, 2000, 
p. 75–96. 
KNORR CETINA, Karin, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, Cambridge/Lon-
don: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 166–171. 
KOISCHWITZ, Svea, Der Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft in den Jahren 1970–1976. Ein Interessen-
verband zwischen Studentenbewegung und Hochschulreform, Köln/Weimar/Wien, Böhlau, 
2017. 
VAN LAAK, Dirk, « Planung, Planbarkeit und Planungseuphorie », Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 
2010, http://docupedia.de/zg/van_laak_planung_v1_de_2010 (11.1.2019). 
MERTON, Robert K., « Science and the Social Order », Philosophy of Science, vol. 5, no 3, 1938, 
p. 321-337. 
MOUFFE, Chantal, The Democratic Paradox, London/New York, Verso, 2000. 
PICHT, Georg, Die deutsche Bildungskatastrophe. Analyse und Dokumentation, 2e éd., München, 
dtv, 1965. 
RANCIERE, Jacques, La Mésentente. Politique et philosophie, Paris, Galilée, 1995. 
REITZ, Tilman, « Academic hierarchies in neo-feudal capitalism: how status competition pro-
cesses trust and facilitates the appropriation of knowledge », Higher Education, vol. 73, 
no 6, 2017, p. 871-886. 
 
35 This is particularly relevant concerning the contemporary attacks on gender studies. The vilification 
of gender studies in the name of the common sense of the “people”, claimed by right-wing populist 
and religious groups, is increasingly complimented by state repression, as the recent case of Hun-
gary sadly shows, where the right-wing populist government of Victor Orbán has shut down gender 
studies departments. Cf. Lesley Wilson, « State control over academic freedom in Hungary threatens 




RINGER, Fritz K., The decline of the German mandarins. The German academic community 1890–
1933, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1969. 
SMITH, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Knuud Haakonssen (éd.), Cambridge et al., Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002. 
WEBER, Max, Wissenschaft als Beruf, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1995. 
WEHRS, Nikolai, Protest der Professoren. Der “Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft” in den 1970er Jah-
ren, Göttingen, Wallstein, 2014. 
WILHOLT, Torsten, Die Freiheit der Forschung. Begründungen und Begrenzungen, Berlin, Suhr-
kamp, 2012. 
WILSON, Lesley, « State control over academic freedom in Hungary threatens all universities », 
The Guardian, 6. septembre 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-net-
work/2018/sep/06/state-control-over-academic-freedom-in-hungary-threatens-all-univer-
sities (15.1.2019). 
 
 
